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is no apologist for the sneak attack.
Rather he objectively analyzes recently
released empirical evidence that reveals
the individuals truly responsible for delaying lawful notice to the United States
about the coming attack. The fault did
not rest with the embassy staff, as portrayed to the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, but with a conspiracy to cover up
facts, a conspiracy that is now traceable
to high-level officials who deliberately
delayed Foreign Ministry telegrams.
Moreover, the Japanese notes delivered
to then–secretary of state Cordell Hull
shortly after the attack were not
declaration-of-war ultimatums as required by international law but watereddown notices about the termination of
bilateral negotiations. The unmistakable conclusion from the evidence is
that the officials in power wanted to
catch the Americans off guard.
Iguchi writes from firsthand experience
and with convincing passion about
those in Japan who even now do not
want to accept responsibility for their
country’s perfidious actions. He cites
authoritatively from official, insider records, not only placing blame where it
belongs but also clearing up the record
to allow closure, moving to more open
and honest U.S.-Japanese relations.
The book provides a detailed time-line
context for the foreign policy pursued
by Japan throughout 1940–41, when the
focus of the Japanese military was on
China and the Soviet Union. Iguchi rejects the thesis that American economic
sanctions and demands for a complete
withdrawal of Japanese forces from
China forced Japan into war. Iguchi
identifies powerful Japanese strategic
thinkers who believed that the only way
resource-poor Japan could win a war
against the United States and Great
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Britain was by a quick and devastating
surprise attack. Iguchi also documents
contrary views held by influential Japanese leaders at the time who tried to
halt the momentum for war.
Iguchi does not believe there was an
American conspiracy to provoke war
with Japan. He also rejects such myths
as that Roosevelt knew in advance of
the Pearl Harbor attack or that Churchill was responsible, meaning to draw
the United States into war against
Hitler.
The value of this book is in how candidly and accurately Iguchi documents
the historical context for the Pacific
War. He explains Japanese motives
based on his unique personal experiences, reinforced by formerly classified
internal Japanese records. There is no
forgiving Japan’s cowardly attack on
Pearl Harbor, but there is much to admire about a senior Japanese diplomat
who courageously does his best to set
the record straight.
MYRON H. NORDQUIST

University of Virginia School of Law
Charlottesville, Virginia

Thomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge,
Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898. New York:
Little, Brown, 2010. 413pp. $29.99

American journalist and historian Evan
Thomas has once again proved why he
is among the foremost modern scholars
of American history, culture, and politics. The War Lovers is a captivating
chronicle of war fever and calculated
crisis manipulated by key leaders in the
run-up to the twentieth century and
culminating in the Spanish-American
War. Thomas assembles a compelling
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historical record for the case that the
war was a conflict of choice, shaped by
powerful politicians and statesmen and
exploited by a rabidly sensationalist
newspaper editor. Reasons for their
conduct abound, from simple machismo to earnest belief in the national
interest, from greed to pure selfindulgence and an insatiable appetite
for controversy. Thomas reveals an instructive case study for current military
and civilian national security professionals on the causal factors for war and
the agendas that influence national decision making. He weaves the archetypal cautionary tale, making clear that
conflict is sometimes the product of irrational and intensely personal calculus
rather than the pure strategic realpolitik
taught in universities and the war
colleges.
The author recasts the image of Theodore Roosevelt from that of the conventional wisdom—the loyal, altruistic
model nationalist—to that of a sophistic, scheming demagogue willing to
stage-manage U.S. foreign policy to his
own egotistic ends and driven by psychological factors, including an extreme
case of father worship. Roosevelt’s
self-loathing, in this view, was so complete that it transformed his outlook
with absolute sincerity—introspection
was not Roosevelt’s strong suit. Similarly, Thomas paints the statesman and
virtual New England hereditary peer
Henry Cabot Lodge as a puppeteer,
dancing marionettes across a stage to
demonstrate his power and influence.
William Randolph Hearst’s legend as a
muckraking proprietor of “journalism
that acts” needs little exposition, but
Thomas fleshes out his character with
a healthy degree of cynicism and edgy
historical humor. The author develops

a plotline of interaction between these
three principal actors and establishments
—the Washington political establishment, embodied by Speaker Thomas
Reed, the Boston Brahmin social establishment, and the Harvard set—showing
the tensions and their resolutions in a
way that makes the characters at once
real, competent, ludicrous, vulnerable,
haughty, adventurous, and patriotic.
Thomas himself is of relatively high
birth, the son of a literary editor and
grandson of a Princeton graduate and
presidential candidate. Although educated at Phillips Andover, Harvard, and
the University of Virginia’s law school,
he shows mercy in describing the conceit and self-importance of fellow Harvard men Roosevelt and Lodge.
The takeaway for this reviewer is that
actors are more complex than the oversimplified caricatures that the modern
press, the academy, and political society
sometimes make them out to be. Roosevelt is often caricatured as a cigarchomping outdoorsman and man of
adventure, leading from the front in the
Cuban campaign and earning accolades
and medals for altruistic heroism. In reality, the picture of Roosevelt painted
by Thomas is of a man not nearly so
selflessly patriotic and capable but
rather of one who was willing to subordinate the national interest to his own
ends.
Thomas shows that in similar circumstances about a hundred years ago, similar actors with analogous agendas acted
in comparable ways, perhaps for similar
purposes. The image of Teddy Roosevelt, the purest American loyalist,
charging up San Juan Hill to liberate
Cuba from the malicious Spanish regime is insufficient to capture the total
picture of the complex political,
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military, and strategic confluence that
led to the Spanish-American War. The
question for the polity is how to design
a system that marginalizes these personal agendas and ideologies to ensure
that questions of war are indeed answered with morality, proper state behavior, and national self-interest as the
foremost considerations. Books like The
War Lovers are instructive in ensuring
we are not doomed to repeat history, or
at least that we can recognize it when
we are.
LT. COL. ROBERT GRAY BRACKNELL, U.S. MARINE
CORPS

Kabul, Afghanistan

Lieven, Dominic. Russia against Napoleon: The
True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace.
New York: Viking, 2010. 618pp. $35.95

The Napoleonic Wars are not exceptions to the rule that the victor of war
writes the history. Yet there is a strange
omission: the mythic history of Napoleon and Russia has been produced
almost wholly by the British and Germans and focuses on the events of 1813
and 1814. Yes, the disastrous French
campaign in Russia is viewed as the beginning of the end and treated as Napoleon’s mistake, but if the Russians are
offhandedly thanked for the war of attrition they fought in 1812, their participation in Western Europe in 1813 and
1814 has been downplayed. This is despite the startling fact that 650,000 Russians operated in the West in those
years and in fact trooped into Paris in
March 1814.
Even historians of Russia have not
made much of the role the Russians
played in 1813–14. They could not do
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so, of course, given the lack of archival
access. But one must also consider the
impact of the myth of 1812, promulgated in War and Peace and later reinforced by the “populism” of the Russian
Revolution. Tolstoy’s myth emphasizes
weather, great distances, Napoleon’s
overconfidence, and especially the heroism of the long-suffering Russian people, who overcame not only the French
but the incompetence of the tsar and
his advisers and generals. All this resonated well with the subsequent need of
nineteenth-century revolutionaries and
Soviets to downplay the successes of the
old regime.
Dominic Lieven’s Russia against Napoleon corrects the existing omission by
bringing to light Russia’s preparation
for and the execution of its involvement
in the diplomatic, political, and military
struggle against Napoleon from the
signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807
until 1814. If Lieven is to be congratulated for being the first to use Russian
sources, available only since 1990, he
deserves greater praise for resisting the
urge to make his story part of the eventual fall of the tsarist regime. One could
really not ask for more in the way of a
military history. It is exhaustively thorough, cognizant of the relationships of
intelligence, diplomacy, and domestic
politics to war, and properly limited in
scope and conclusions.
Lieven convincingly demonstrates the
real accomplishments in terms of strategy and execution of war of Alexander
I, his foreign-policy advisers, Count
Nesselrode’s Paris intelligence apparat,
and military officers. His greater
achievement, however, is his focus on
logistics and—what might seem to be a
minor matter—the role of the horse.
These are perhaps the largest and most
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